

Rethinking the Role of *Manas* for Establishing the Subjectivity of Buddhism: Focused on Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka* and Sthiramati's Works

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Abstract

[Objective] The purpose of this paper is to establish the subject as the foundation for metaphysical questions through an analysis of Yogācāra school. Specially, it will explain a question unique to humans, “Who am I?,” focusing on Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka* (hereafter PSk) and Sthiramati's works. This paper aims to respond to this concept from the Yogācāra perspective, rather than the early Buddhist view of five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*). This framework allows the introduction of new terms that did not exist before Yogācāra, namely the storehouse mind (*ālayavijñāna*) and the notion of ‘I’ (*manas*).

[Contents] This paper considers *manas* as the subject posing metaphysical questions and aims to argue for its positive influence, contrary to conventional understanding. Therefore, I argue that *manas* is not a hindrance to enlightenment but rather its prerequisite. If a person suddenly aspires to *nirvāṇa*, their *manas* will face more turmoil than anyone else. This is equivalent to establishing a view of subjectivity. In this paper, I explore the role of *manas* in the context of the four types of contaminating mental factors (*kleśa-caitasa*) and self-reflectivity (*manyanātmaka*), establishing *manas* as the subject.

[Conclusions] In conclusion, this paper seeks to comprehend a part of the structure in PSk and provide a positive explanation for the existence of *manas*, which is considered peripheral, by presenting it as the subject.

[Keywords] *Manas*, Vasubandhu, *Pañcaskandhaka*, Sthiramati, *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*, *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*

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불교의 주체성 확립을 위한 말나식의 역할 재고: 세친의 『대승오온론』과 안혜의 저작을 중심으로

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요 약

[연구 목적] 본고는 인간 고유의 능력, 즉 형이상학적인 물음을 던지는 토대인 ‘주체’를, 불교 유식사상에서 입론하는 것이 목적이다. 초기불교의 오온이 아닌 유식적 관점으로 풀어쓴 세친의 『대승오온론』과 그의 대표 주석가 안혜의 저작을 중심으로 그것을 해명할 것이다. 그 이유는 유식사상에 들어와서부터 기존에 존재하지 않던 ‘알아야식’과 ‘말나식’이라는 새로운 용어를 도입하고 있기 때문이다. 여기서 ‘나는 누구인가?’라고 되묻는 번뇌를 일으키는 산물, 즉 형이상학을 위한 ‘주체’가 직접적으로 발견되는데, 그것은 바로 말나식이다. 늘 4가지 번뇌 심소를 동반하기 때문이다. 또 말나식은 알아야식을 ‘나’라고 집요하게 집착하며, 마치 인간의 근원이란 무엇인지 자문하여 번뇌를 발생시키는 것과 같은데, 이는 열반에 방해되는 부정적인 측면만이 강조되는 식이다.

[연구 내용] 철학하는 인간, 즉 형이상학적인 인간은 삶을 영위할수록 말나식이라는 자아관이 더욱 비대해질 것이다. 철저히 염오의로 점철되어 불교의 궁극적 목표인 열반과 멀어지게 될 것이다. 그러나 말나식은 단지 열반과 상충하는 개념이 아니라 열반의 전제, 즉 주체이다. 어느 날 문득 해탈을 위해 정진하고자 하는 인간이 있다면, 그의 말나식은 그 누구보다도 번뇌로 그늘져 있을 것이다. 이는 도리어 그의 주체관이 확립되어있다는 말과 다름없다. 따라서 『대승오온론』에 산재된 여러 개념을 말나식의 주체관 확립을 위한 전제로 설정하려고 한다. ‘주체’를 함축하는 5온·12처·18계, 주체의 안과 밖[內·外], 행온 중 심불상행법의 일부 내용을 주체로서 말나식의 배경으로 제시한다. 이후 본격적으로 말나식의 4가지 번뇌심소와 자기반성의 역할을 하는 식으로서 말나식을 탐구하여, 주체로서 말나식을 확립한다.

[결론] 결론적으로 이 글은 『대승오온론』의 일부 구조를 파악하고, 말나식의 주변적 존재 이유를 ‘주체’로 내세워, 그것을 긍정적으로 해명한 글이다.

[주제어] 말나식, 세친, 대승오온론, 안혜, 유식삼십송석, 대승광오온론

I . Introduction

While humans live their lives, they cannot help but ask the question: “Who am I?” How, then, can this profound question be addressed in Buddhism? If this metaphysical question is answered through one of the three dharma seals (*dharmamudrā trilakṣaṇā*), namely non-self (*anātman*), individuals tend to be de-emphasized in the context of humanity. The pivotal tenet of Buddhism, *anātman*, clarifies the existence of ‘others,’ and it is a thought system that pushes the concept of ‘I’ into the background. Buddhism’s claim that promotes symbiosis is reasonable. However, the following questions arise: first, is it possible for the ‘I’ to continue asking the question ‘Who am I?’ And second, the notion of ‘subject’ considered restricted in Buddhism?

Is it really true that Buddha keeps silent about the metaphysical question of indeterminateness (*avyākata*)? It has been passed down that Buddha refused to answer this question regardless of this present life (Frauwallner, 2010: 21).

However, this paper argues that this metaphysical question should be resolved first. To put it another way, this paper suggests that one can truly focus on the present life only after experiencing immersion in metaphysical inquiries. It would be reasonable to expect Buddha to have deeply contemplated this metaphysical question while being aware of the questioning ‘I’ himself. Before Buddha’s awakening, he was deeply bound by birth, old age, sickness, and death, and he starts to question the nature of existence (Ñāṇamoli, 2001: 10). He explicitly states ‘self’ in advance, at the end of Buddha’s life,¹⁾ implying a tacit acknowledgment of subject.

Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to establish the subjectivity of the foundation of metaphysical questions in Yogācāra. I will primarily elucidate the inherent human question, ‘Who am I?’, through Vasubandhu’s (世親, ca. 400-480) *Pañcaskandhaka* (hereafter PSk)²⁾. The

1) DN16: “*tasmātiḥānanda, attadīpā viharatha attasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā, dhammadīpā dhammasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā.*”(And how, Ānanda, is a bhikkhu an island unto himself, a refuge unto himself, seeking no external refuge; with the Dhamma as his island, the Dhamma as his refuge, seeking no other refuge?) English translated by Vajira, S. and Story, F., 1988: 33.

2) Vasubandhu’s PSk has been published in Sanskrit, from the Diplomatic Edition to the Critical Edition by Li Xuezhong and Ernst Steinkellner, and Tibetan and Chinese versions are included as well. According to Steinkellner, PSk can be roughly summarized as Asaṅga’s (無著, ca. 395-470) first part of *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (hereafter AS), specifically the Abhidharma summary relating to Yogācāra. Although PSk belongs to Yogācāra’s literature, it is also related to Vasubandhu’s *Trimśikārikā* (hereafter Tr) and intimately connected to *Abhidharmakośabāṣya* (hereafter AKBh). Therefore, PSk is

five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*) are significant concepts, and it is said that a human is composed of body and mind (*kāyacitta*). This study also delves into mental factors (*caitta*) found within the treatise, including Sthiramati's (安慧, ca. 510-570) TrBh. This particular aspect has received limited attention in Yogācāra literature (Ueda, 1987: 65), which led to the selection of TrBh for this study. Additionally, I will utilize *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (hereafter PSkV), which is Sthiramati's commentary on PSk.

This paper does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the views on *pañcaskandha* in early Buddhism but instead focuses on the view of Yogācāra. The reason for this choice is that new concepts like storehouse mind (*ālayavijñāna*) and the notion of 'I'³ (*manas*)⁴ are introduced in

considered an important text that captures the connection between Abhidharma and Yogācāra. The Sanskrit terms used in *Yogācārabhūmi* (hereafter Y), AS, AKBh, PSk, and *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya* (hereafter TrBh) correspond to mental factors (*caitta*) and factors dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayukta*) each other.

- 3) The "Notion of 'I'" is Kramer's English translation of *manas* (Kramer, 2013: xxviii).
- 4) Yogācāra clarifies the structure of the eight consciousnesses. *Manas* is the seventh consciousness, succeeding six existing consciousnesses. It is accompanied with the universal (*sarvatraga-caitta*), and specifically by self-delusion (*ātma-moha*), self-view (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), self-conceit (*ātma-māna*), and self-love (*ātma-sneha*), which are the four contaminating mental factors (*kleśa-caitasa*). This paper focuses on these four *kleśa-caitasa*. The term '*manas*' is commonly used in Xuanzang's Chinese translation of the 『成唯識論』 (*Chengweishilun*). The seventh consciousness is referred to by various Chinese terms.

I have added some literature and made corrections to this text (Jung, 2015: 17-26). The updated version is as follows:

- 『阿毘達磨俱舍論』 (*Apidamojushelun*) (T.1558): 意
- 『瑜伽師地論』 (*Yujiazhidilun*) (T.1579): 末那・染汚末那・意
- 『成唯識論』 (*Chengweishilun*) (T.1585): 思量能變識・末那・染汚・第七・第七識
- 『唯識三十論頌』 (*Weishisanshilunsong*) (T.1586): 思量・末那・第二能變
- 『轉識論』 (*Zhuanshilun*) (T.1587): 執識
- 『攝大乘論』 (*Shedachenglun*) (T.1593): 意・染汚・染汚意
- 『辯中邊論』 (*Bianzhongbianlun*) (T.1600): 染末那
- 『顯揚聖教論』 (*Xianyangshengjiaolun*) (T.1602): 意根・意・意識
- 『大乘莊嚴經論』 (*Dachengzhuangyanjinglun*) (T.1604): 染汚識
- 『大乘百法明門論』 (*Dachengbaifamingmenlun*) (T.1614): 末那識

When the Sanskrit term '*manas*' (Tib. *nyon yid nam par shes pa*) is translated into Chinese as the seventh consciousness '末那識' and the sixth consciousness is represented as to as '意識,' there is a clear distinction. Specifically, when Sanskrit '*manovijñāna*' is used, it can be ambiguous whether it indicates the 6th or 7th consciousness. However, it is understood as '*mano-nāma vijñāna*,' '*kliṣṭamanah*,' '*kliṣṭam manah*,' '*kliṣṭamanovijñāna*,' '*pradhānamanovijñāna*,' and so on when it specifically denotes the seventh consciousness. In this paper, the term '*manas*' as defined in PSk is

Yogācāra. The subject of ‘Who am I?’ is directly related to *manas*. *Manas* functions as a consciousness (*viññāna*) that clings to *ālayaviññāna* as ‘I’ and is accompanied by *kleśa-caitasa*, which poses metaphysical questions as an inherent ability of human beings. This implies that such questioning entails afflictions (*kleśa*), and afflictions are an essential element in metaphysical inquiry. *Manas* is emphasized from a negative perspective and is seen as an obstacle to enlightenment (*nirvāṇa*).

However, the aim of this paper is to argue for the positive influence of *manas*, contrary to the conventional understanding. By doing so, *manas* becomes more expansive. This is seen as a departure from *nirvāṇa*, which is described as the transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparivṛtti*)⁵⁾ in Yogācāra. However, *manas* is not an obstacle to enlightenment, but rather its prerequisite in the ordinary world (*laukika*). *Manas* is necessary for the process of *āśrayaparivṛtti* and should exist in ordinary places. Therefore, the *manas* as a subject should exist because the greater the doubt, the greater the potential for *nirvāṇa*.⁶⁾ If a person suddenly aspires to *nirvāṇa*, their *manas* will face more turmoil than anyone else. This is equivalent to establishing a view of subjectivity.⁷⁾

The main outline of this analysis is as follows: Firstly, I will provide an understanding of the prerequisite concept for establishing the view of subjectivity in PSk. I will identify the reasons behind the inclusion of the five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*), twelve bases (*ayatāna*), and eighteen elements (*dhātu*), both inside and outside the realm of subject, as well as the factors dissociated from mind (*cittaviprayukta*) in relation to impulses (*saṃskāra*). In particular, I explore the role of *kleśa-caitasa* in *manas* and its function as *viññāna* in the process of self-reflection, ultimately establishing *manas* as the subject. In conclusion, this paper seeks to comprehend a part of the

employed. The above content can be referred to as follows: Cao, 2022: 202-220.

5) Tr: *acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānaṃ lokottaraṃ ca tat |*
āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhādauṣṭhulyahānitaḥ || 29

It is no mind, no-acquirement and is supramundane.

Because dual debilitation is extinguished, transformation of the basis. (The underlined text is by me.)

6) 『禪關策進』(T.2024, 1100b02-3) : “大疑大悟”

7) There would be a counter-question: If the view of the subject is established as an ordinary person, does it lose subjectivity after one enters *nirvāṇa*? It does not. Once one enters *nirvāṇa*, there will be no questioning of ‘Who am I?’ This does not imply the absence of subjectivity. Rather, it signifies a transformation from ‘I’ to ‘We.’ It is like Siddhārtha becoming the Buddha under the Bodhi tree and then going around preaching for 45 years, meeting various people. Generally, when someone delivers a sermon, there must be a listener. Through this process, the shift occurs from ‘I’ to ‘We.’

structure within PSk and presents a positive explanation for the existence of *manas*.

II. The Basic Prerequisite for the Subject

‘Who am I?’ as a question lying at the foundation of ‘I,’ pertains to this world. ‘Why am I’ and not someone else?’ is a question about the existence of ‘I’ in the objective world, living to experience all things. In Buddhism, this is referred to as *pañcaskandha*, *ayātana*, *dhātu*, and according to PSk, it is divided into the internal and external aspects of the subject. Why, then, is this framework established? It is explained in Buddhism as a means to break down the attachments of ordinary individuals and their surroundings, as Buddhism denies the substantiality of the subject. However, this paper proposes that this framework serves as a metaphysical premise for the ‘I’ questioning itself, essentially serving as a prerequisite for establishing the subject. To probe deeper into the reasons behind this design, let us explore the PSk.

1. The Reason for Explaining *Pañcaskandha*, *Ayātana*, *Dhātu*, and the Subject as Criteria

Q: What is the purpose of explaining the aggregates and so on?

A: It is to rectify three types of attachments.

In the order [of aggregates, twelve bases, and eighteen elements], the three types of attachments are as follows: The attachment [of considering the aggregates as not just five integrated components but] as a single entity, the attachment of considering the self as an entity that enjoys the world of objects [through the twelve bases], and the attachment of considering the self as an agent or subject [through the eighteen elements].⁸⁾

In the context of Buddhism, a human being’s based on common sense, is said to involve *pañcaskandha*, *ayātana*, and *dhātu*. Within this framework, there are various aspects of attachment, such as viewing the ego as a singular substance, perceiving the ego as an entity

8) PSk, 20: “*kim artham skandhādi deśanā | trividhātmagrāhapratipakṣeṇa yathākramam | trividhātmagrāha ekatvagrāho bhokṛtvagrāhaḥ kartṛtvagrāhaḥ ||*”

『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 850b08-10): “問：以何義故宣說蘊等？答：為欲對治三種我執。如其次第三種我執者、謂一性我執、受者我執、作者我執。”

that enjoys and experiences, and understanding the ego as the concept of a subject. These different perspectives all contribute to the understanding of the existence of the ego, and ultimately form the concept of the ‘subject.’

In general, the eighteen elements (*dhātu*) represent that the six sense organs (*indriya*), the six objects (*viṣaya*), and the six types of consciousness (*viññāna*), encompassing all aspects of our experiences. I suggest that this passage discusses the division of *pañcaskandha*, *ayātana*, and *dhātu* as criteria for understanding the subject, and the proposed content of the subject, as outlined below.

How many are the internal [elements]?

There are twelve elements. It excludes color, sound, smell, taste, touch, and the mental domain.

How many are the external [elements]?

There are six. They are the ones excluded from the previous twelve.⁹⁾

2. The Factors Dissociated from Mind (*Cittaviprayukta*)

The factors dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayukta*) in PSk follow the system of Sarvāstivāda (Kramer, 2014b: 295) and are in accordance with AKBh.¹⁰⁾

The question then arises: what is *cittaviprayukta*? Literally, it means that the impulses (*saṃskāra*) do not correspond to the mind (*citta*). It is allowed to express temporarily [→ “*prajñāpyante*”] related to form (*rūpa*), mind (*citta*), and mental factors (*caitta*).¹¹⁾ Namely, it pertains to objects that are considered to be unreal (Moro, 2015: 201). It consists of possession (*prāpti*), equipoise of non-conception (*asaññi-samāpatti*), equipoise of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), state of non-conception (*āsaññika*), faculty of vitality (*jīvitendriya*), homogeneous character (*nikāyasabhāga*), birth (*jāti*), senescence (*jarā*), continuance (*sthiti*), impermanence (*anityatā*), sets of names (*nāma-kāya*), sets of phrases (*pada-kāya*), sets of syllables (*vyañjana-kāya*), and nature of an ordinary person (*prthagjanatva*)¹²⁾. This paper focuses specifically on *nikāyasabhāga*, *jāti*, *jarā*, *sthiti*, *anityatā*, and *prthagjanatva*, examining their aspects.

9) PSk, 22: “*katy ādhyātmikāḥ | dvādaśa rūpaśabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyadharmadhātūnsthāpayitvā | kati bāhyāḥ | ṣaḍ ye sthāpitāḥ |*”

『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 850c01): “幾是內? 謂十二、除色、聲、香、味、觸及法界。幾是外? 謂六即所除。”

10) The Chinese translation marks the order of Paramārtha and Xuanzang in AKBh. For reference, the comparative studies of the literature with Y refer to the following. Kramer, 2013: 1020-1022.

1) *Nikāyasabhāga*

What is a homogeneous character? It is the common feature of human beings.¹³⁾

The above sentence distinguishes humans who engage in reading and writing from all other creatures. This distinction arises because these humans are encompassed by *nāma-kāya*, *pada-kāya*, and *vyañjana-kāya* as part of *cittaviprayukta*. Similarities among humans can carry various meanings, depending on the individual. The shared characteristics that help humans in preserving their lives are of primary importance. However, these characteristics also provide space for expanded thinking and exploring the common inclination to pose metaphysical

PSk	AKBh		AS	Y
<i>prāpti</i> (得)	<i>prāpti</i> (至)	(得)	<i>prāpti</i> (得)	<i>prāpti</i> (得)
	<i>aprāpti</i> (非至)	(非得)		
<i>nikāyasabhāga</i> (衆同分)	<i>sabhāgatā</i> (同分)		<i>nikāyasabhāga</i> (衆同分)	<i>nikāyasabhāga</i> [tā] (衆同分)
<i>āsaṃjñika</i> (無想所有)	<i>āsaṃjñika</i> (無想)		<i>āsaṃjñika</i> (無想異熟)	<i>āsaṃjñika</i> (無想異熟)
<i>asaṃjñisamāpatti</i> (無想等至)	<i>asaṃjñisamāpatti</i> (無想定)		<i>asaṃjñisamāpatti</i> (無想定)	<i>asaṃjñisamāpatti</i> (無想定)
<i>nirodhasamāpatti</i> (滅盡等至)	<i>nirodhasamāpatti</i> (滅盡定)		<i>nirodhasamāpatti</i> (滅盡定)	<i>nirodhasamāpatti</i> (滅盡定)
<i>jīvitendriya</i> (命根)	<i>jīvitendriya</i> (命根)		<i>jīvitendriya</i> (命根)	<i>jīvitendriya</i> (命根)
<i>jāti</i> (生)	<i>jāti</i> (生)		<i>jāti</i> (生)	<i>jāti</i> (生)
<i>sthiti</i> (住)	<i>sthiti</i> (住)		<i>sthiti</i> (住)	<i>sthiti</i> (住)
<i>jarā</i> (老)	<i>jarā</i> (老)	(異)	<i>jarā</i> (老)	<i>jarā</i> (老)
<i>anyatā</i> (無常)	<i>anyatā</i> (無常)	(滅)	<i>anyatā</i> (無常)	<i>anyatā</i> (無常)
<i>nāmakāya</i> (名身)	<i>nāmakāya</i> (名聚)	(名身)	<i>nāmakāya</i> (名身)	<i>nāmakāya</i> (名身)
<i>padakāya</i> (句身)	<i>padakāya</i> (句聚)	(句身)	<i>padakāya</i> (句身)	<i>padakāya</i> (句身)
<i>vyañjanakāya</i> (文身)	<i>vyañjanakāya</i> (文聚)	(文身)	<i>vyañjanakāya</i> (文身)	<i>vyañjanakāya</i> (文身)
<i>prtagjanatva</i> (異生性)	<i>prtagjanatva</i> (凡夫性)	(異生性)	<i>prtagjanatva</i> (異生性)	<i>prtagjanatva</i> (異生性)

- 11) PSk, 13: “*cittaviprayuktāḥ saṃskārāḥ katame | ye rūpacittacaitasikāvasthāsu prajñāpyante tattvānyatva-taśca na prajñāpyante ||*”
『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 849b29-c02): “云何心不相應行? 謂依色、心、心法分位、但假建立、不可施設決定異性及不異性。”
- 12) Regarding the English expression of *cittaviprayukta* to date, the reader should refer to Kramer, 2013: 1020-1021.
- 13) PSk, 15: “*nikāyasabhāgatā katamā | yā sattvānāmātmabhāvatulyatā |*”
『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 849c16): “云何眾同分? 謂諸有情自類相似為性。”

questions, which is of secondary significance. Therefore, we can infer from this the premise that philosophical inquiry is inherent in humans.

2) *Jāti, Jarā, Sthiti, and Anityatā*

What is birth?

What exists is formed from homogeneous character that did not originally exist.¹⁴⁾

What is senescence?

Similarly, durability [which is the birth of a homogeneous character,] undergoes change.¹⁵⁾

What is continuance?

Similarly, durability [which is the birth of a homogeneous character,] continues.¹⁶⁾

What is impermanence?

Similarly, durability [which is the birth of a homogeneous character,] is to be cut off.¹⁷⁾

This paragraph describes birth, change, stream, and disconnection as characteristics of birth-implying, in turn, life, death, sickness, and old age. Humans are beings that live their lives, yet they are also beings that are dying. Faced with limited time, the question “What is life?” cannot help but arise. This inquiry is part of the process that establishes subjectivity.

3) *Prthagjanatva*

What is the nature of an ordinary person?

It does not acquire the dharmas of a sage.¹⁸⁾

14) PSk, 15: “*jātiḥ katamā | nikāyasabhāge yaḥ saṃskārāṇāmabhūtā bhāvaḥ |*”

『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 849c16-17): “云何為生? 謂於眾同分中、諸行本無今有為性。”

15) PSk, 15: “*jarā katamā | tathaiḥ teṣāṃ prabandhānyathātvam |*”

『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 849c17-18): “云何為老? 謂即如是諸行相續變異為性。”

16) PSk, 15: “*sthiti katamā | tathaiḥ teṣāṃ prabandhānuvṛttiḥ |*”

『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 849c18-19): “云何為住? 謂即如是諸行相續隨轉為性。”

17) PSk, 15: “*anityatā katamā | tathā teṣāṃ prabandhoparamaḥ |*”

『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 849c19-20): “云何無常? 謂即如是諸行相續謝滅為性。”

18) PSk, 16: “*prthagjanatvaṃ katamā | āryāṇām dharmāṇāmalābhāḥ ||*”

『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 849c25-26): “云何異生性? 謂於諸聖法不得為性。如是等類已說行蘊。”

This stanza describes an ordinary person. The subject of an ordinary person is a being that is full of afflictions (*kleśa*). This is because the mind, as a subject, is always accompanied with the *kleśa-caitasa*. However, once one becomes a sage, these afflictions disappear. This signifies the stage of superego. The above passage indicates that before one acquires the dharmas of a sage (before one transcends their subjectivity), the subject should be taken as a premise.

III. Establishment for the View of the Subject

We can observe the hypothesis of the subject based on the argument developed thus far. This step involves the examination of *manas* as the subject. *Manas* appears as consciousness (*vijñānaskandha*) within the five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*), and it consists of both *manas* and the storehouse mind (*ālayavijñāna*). *Manas* is a consciousness persistently directed towards *ālayavijñāna*, and I will also observe *ālayavijñāna*.

1. The Composition of *Vijñānaskandha*

[Out of *pañcaskandha*] What is *vijñānaskandha*?

Vijñānaskandha is the process of making an object known¹⁹⁾ to oneself. It is termed as mind (*citta*) and also as thinking (*manas*)²⁰⁾. This is because it relies on various factors²¹⁾ and *manas*.²²⁾

19) The term ‘*vijñapti*’ is translated as ‘識,’ ‘representation,’ ‘perception,’ and so on. There are various opinions among scholars, as discussed in Kang, 2021: 64-65. This paper adopts the translation by Moro and Kramer, which is ‘making known of objects,’ as mentioned in Moro, 2015: 227, and Kramer, 2014a: 313.

20) It is said that “*manas*” is synonymous with *citta*. However, in this context, it does not mean the notion of ‘I’ (*manas*), which is the seventh consciousness. Traditionally, *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñapti* are considered synonymous, as referenced in AKBh, *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (hereafter LAS), and *Viṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (hereafter VŚ).

AKBh, 61: “*cittaṃ mano ’tha vijñānam eka-arthaṃ*”

LAS, 648: “*cittaṃ vikalpo vijñaptir mano vijñānam eva ca | ālayaṃ tribhavaś ceṣṭā ete cittasya paryayāḥ*” ||10.459||

VŚ, 149: “*cittaṃ mano vijñānam vijñaptiś ceti paryāyāḥ* |”

21) What are the “various factors”? Let us refer to PSkV. PSkV, Kramer (ed.): 89-90: “*citratām upādāya cittam ity ucyate | ... yad etac citratvāc cittam ity uktam taj jātīm adhikṛtya na lakṣaṇam | lakṣaṇam tu pratīniyatā lambanākāratvān na citram iti na tat prādhānyena cittam* |” (“[it is stated that] the mind

1) *Ālayavijñāna*

Principally,²³⁾ the mind is *ālayavijñāna*. Specifically, there are the seeds of all formations piled up. It is also a consciousness that is not defined by the image of an object. It is of singular types and acts ceaselessly.²⁴⁾

2) *Manas*

Principally, *manas* aims at *ālayavijñāna* as an object. It is always accompanied by self-delusion (*ātma-moha*), self-view (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), self-conceit (*ātma-māna*), and self-love (*ātma-sneha*). It is of a singular type and constantly active. [However,] it is excluded in the stage of an Arhat, the state of a sage, and equipoise of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*).²⁵⁾

relies on various factors. The diversity of the mind is related to different types of images, rather than the characteristics of the mind itself. The characteristic of the mind is not diverse because specific support is associated with an image, as it primarily does not denotes the concept of mind.”

In this context, the term “characteristic” (*lakṣaṇa*) does not correspond to the Tibetan translation ‘*skad cig*.’ Contextually, this part should be understood as referring to the ‘moment’ (*kṣaṇa*) according to the Tibetan translation. In other words, the concept of diversity does not pertain to the various forms that arise in a single moment, but rather to the multitude of types of support that arise in each moment. This point is emphasized in the paper referenced as follows: Chigaku, S., 2015: 986-987.

- 22) PSk, 16: “*viññānaṃ katamat | ālambanaṃbijñaptiḥ | cittam mano 'pi tat | citratām manaḥsanniśrayatām copādāya |*”
『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 849c27-28): “云何識蘊？謂於所緣境了別為性。亦名心意、由採集故、意所攝故。”
- 23) Moro translates “*prādhānyena*” as “extremely special (最も勝れた)” (Moro, 2015: 243). It seems that he considers “*prādhānyena*” to correspond to the meaning of “最勝:”『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 849c28-29): “最勝心者、謂阿賴耶識 (The underlined text is by me).” Lee translates it as “actually” (Lee, 1992: 282), which aligns with the purpose of this paper. This paper regards “*prādhānyena*” as “principally,” which reinforces Sthiramati’s commentary: PSkV, Kramer (ed.): 90: “*prādhānyena punaś cittam ālayavijñānam | atraiva kāraṇam āha | tathā hi tac citaṃ sarvasaṃskārabījair iti | pratikṣaṇaṃ sarvasaṃskārabījais citatvāc cittam prādhānyena tad eva cittam*.” (On the other hand, [the root text] “principally, mind is *ālayavijñāna*,” here the reason is stated as follows. “Specifically, it is piled up by seeds of all formations. Because the seeds of all formations are filed up every moment, it is called mind. Principally, it is only named mind.”). The Tibetan translation, PSkV, D231b6: “*dn̄gos su*,” supports this translation (“principally”).
- 24) PSk, 16: “*prādhānyena punaś cittam ālayavijñānam | tathā hi tac citaṃ sarvasaṃskārabījaiḥ | tat punar aparicchinnāmbanākāram vijñānam ekajātīyaṃ santānānivr̥ttiḥ ca |*”
『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 849c28-850a01): “最勝心者、謂阿賴耶識。何以故？由此識中諸行種子皆採集故。又此行緣不可分別、前後一類相續隨轉。”
- 25) PSk, 17: “*prādhānyena mana ālayavijñānālambanaṃ sadātmanohātmadṛṣṭyātmanāntmasneḥādisamprayukta vijñānam ekjātīyaṃ santānānivr̥tti ca | arhattvāyamārganirodhasamāpattyavasthāmssthāpayitva ||*”
『大乘五蘊論』(T.1612, 850a07-10): “最勝意者、謂緣阿賴耶識為境、恒與我癡、我見、我慢及我愛等相應

2. *Manas* as a Subject

1) The Four Contaminating Mental Factors (*Kleśa-caitasa*) in *Manas*

The *kleśa-caitasa* in PSk is always accompanied by *manas*. One of the commentaries on PSk, Sthiramati's PSkV, also states them, but it does not provide further interpretation.²⁶⁾ However, in another work by Sthiramati, the TrBh, these factors are discussed.²⁷⁾ Specifically, *manas* is mentioned in the sixth stanza of the Tr, and line cd of that stanza describes the *kleśa-caitasa*.

[The four contaminating mental factors are named:] self-view (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), self-delusion (*ātma-moha*), self-conceit (*ātma-māna*), and self-love (*ātma-sneha*).²⁸⁾

The four contaminating mental factors indicated in the PSk have a different order of Tr, but the difference in their ordering does not change their interpretation. Let us examine the specific significance of these four factors in TrBh.

To regard the 'I' as appropriated aggregates (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*)²⁹⁾ is self-view (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), which

之識、前後一類相續隨轉、除阿羅漢果及與聖道滅盡等至現在前位。”

26) However, some of the contents of the *kleśa-caitasa* mentioned in the subsequent part of the text, namely 'appropriated aggregates' (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*), 'ignorance' (*moha*), and 'self-conceit' (*māna*), are discussed in the section on afflictions (*kleśa*) in the PSkV (PSkV_s, Kramer (ed.): 52-63). They are not fundamentally different from the contents of the TrBh, and there are instances where they exhibit a parallel structure. For the sake of natural flow, I will proceed with the discussion using only the TrBh without quoting directly from the PSkV_s.

27) Regarding the historicity of Sthiramati, there was initially some controversy, but colophons attributed to "Sthiramati" are found in the following texts: PSkV, *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, TrBh, and *Abhidharmakośaṭīkā Tattvārtha*. In particular, PSkV and TrBh exhibit significant textual similarities, and Jowita Kramer has conducted comparative studies on the subject. For further details, refer to Kramer, 2019: 456; Nguyen, Cuong Tu, 1990: 44; Kramer, 2013: throughout the text.

28) Tr: *ātmadrṣṭyātmamohātmamānātmāsnehasaṃjñitaiḥ* || 6cd

29) For further information on the explanation of appropriated aggregates (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*), please refer to the following.

① TrBh, 38: "*tathā hy ātmadrṣṭiprabhavā rāgādayaḥ kleśāḥ pudgalanairātmyāvabodhaś ca satkāyadrṣṭeḥ pratipakṣatvāt tatprahāṇāya pravartamānaḥ sarvakleśān prajahāti*]" (Specifically, desires (*rāga*) and other afflictions (*kleśa*) arise from self-view. If one makes efforts to eliminate it, all afflictions are eliminated. This is because the selflessness of person of enlightenment rectifies the notion of appropriated aggregates.)

represents the view of an individual self. “*Moha*” corresponds to ignorance. Ignorance pertaining to oneself is self-delusion (*ātma-moha*)³⁰. The object of the ‘I,’ namely, is known as self-conceit (*ātma-māna*),³¹ signifying conceit associated with oneself. Attachment regarding oneself is self-love (*ātma-sneha*), indicating the love directed towards oneself. Among these, those who possess ignorance about *ālayavijñāna* give rise to self-view. By uplifting the mind self-conceit arises, asserting one’s existence. When these three factors are present, attachment towards the concept of oneself arises. This is sung in stanza.

Ignorance, self-view, self-conceit, and attachment contaminate the four types of *manas* that possess the characteristic of self-reflection. However, these very types of *manas* always possess a distorted nature, serving as the cause of both wholesome and indeterminate states of mind.³²

② TrBh, 88: “*dr̥ḡ iti sāmānyanirdeṣe 'pi kleśādhikārāt pañcaiva kleśātmikāḥ satkāyadr̥ṣṭyādikā dr̥ṣṭayaḥ sambadhyante | na laukikī samyagdr̥ṣṭir anāsravā vā*” (The term ‘view’ is commonly used in everyday language, [but in this context,] it refers to afflictions. It does not denote the right view of the world or the view that is free from contamination. Instead, it corresponds to the five appropriated aggregates that inherently possess afflictions.)

- 30) For further information on the explanation of ignorance (*moha*), please refer to the following. TrBh, 84: “*moho 'pāyeṣu sugatau nirvāṇe tatpratiṣṭhāpākeṣu hetuṣu teṣāṃ cāvīparīte hetuphalasambandhe yad ajñānam | ayañ ca saṃkleśotpattisaṃniśriyadānakarmakaḥ | tatra kleśakarmajanmātmakas trividhaḥ saṃkleśaḥ | tasyotpattiḥ pūrvapūrvasaṃkleśanimittād uttarottarasya saṃkleśasyātmalābhaḥ | tasyotpattēḥ saṃniśrayadānakarma*” (Ignorance is the ignorance of unfortunate destinies, fortunate states of existence, nirvana, the establishment of causal connections, and their undistorted cause-and-effect relationship. And this ignorance is the action that becomes the basis for the creation of contamination. Among them, there are three types of afflictions, karma, and birth by nature. Their arising is the transformation of afflictions from the complete previous state into afflictions of the complete subsequent state. It is the functioning that relies on the arising of those afflictions.)
- 31) For further information on the explanation of conceit (*māna*), please refer to the following. TrBh, 86: “*mānaḥ | māno hi nāma sarva eva satkāyadr̥ṣṭisamāśrayeṇa pravartate | sa punaś cittasyonmatilakṣaṇaḥ | tathā hy ātmātmīyabhāvaṃ skandheṣv adhyāropyāyam aham idaṃ mamety ātmānam tena tena viśeṣeṇonnamayati | anyebhyo 'dhikaṃ manyate*” (Self-conceit, also known as conceit, arises from relying on appropriated aggregates. It is a characteristic of elevating the mind. Specifically, regarding the five aggregates, it mistakenly grasps them as “I” and “mine.” It asserts, “This is ‘I,’ this is ‘mine’.” The notion of “I” is falsely established in various specific ways, thinking oneself to be superior to others.)
- 32) TrBh, 64-66: “*upādānaskandheṣv ātmeti darśanam ātmadr̥ṣṭiḥ satkāyadr̥ṣṭir ity arthaḥ | moho 'jñānam | ātmany ajñānam ātmamohaḥ | ātmaviṣaye māna ātmamāno 'smimāna ity arthaḥ | ātmani sneha ātmasneha ātmapremety arthaḥ | tatrālayavijñānasvarūpe saṃmūḍhaḥ sann ālayavijñāne ātmadr̥ṣṭim utpādayati | ātmadarśanād yā cittasyonnatīḥ so 'smimānaḥ | etasmiṃs traye saty ātmābhimāne vastuni yo 'bhiṣvaṅgaḥ sa ātmasnehaḥ | āha ca | avidyayā cātmadr̥ṣṭyā cāsmimānena tṛṣṇayā |*

When defining the four mental afflictions according to the order presented in the PSk, they can be understood as follows:

- (1) Self-delusion (*ātma-moha*): Ignorance about the self.
- (2) Self-view (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*): Considering the existence of a self, namely, grasping onto appropriated aggregates.
- (3) Self-conceit (*ātma-māna*): Conceit related to the self.
- (4) Self-attachment (*ātma-sneha*): Craving or attachment toward the self.

‘I’ see something and then ‘I’ intervene by judging myself again. The act of thinking ‘I’ inevitably leads to the existence of afflictions. ‘Self-delusion’ (*ātma-moha*), indicates ignorance of the ‘I,’ specifically revealing a lack of interest in *nirvāṇa*. This counters the ultimate purpose of Buddhism, as it absorbs the ‘I’ rather than focusing on the ultimate goal. This can correspond to ‘self-view’ (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*) and ‘self-attachment’ (*ātma-sneha*). Now, let us consider the relation of ‘self-conceit’ (*ātma-māna*) to posing metaphysical questions about human nature. Essentially, self-conceit implies vanity and a belief in one’s superiority over others. However, this paper primarily focuses on establishing the distinction between ‘I’ and ‘other.’ It pertains to value judgment, with self-conceit being the subsequent event. Therefore, ‘I’ becomes the subject of value judgment that precedes earlier stages.

2) Self-reflective Notion of ‘I’ (*Manas*)

Next, the crucial concept of *manas* unveils its true intention.

Because *manas* is always a self-reflective³³⁾ consciousness. This is called principally *manas*.³⁴⁾

According to the preceding content, *manas*, no matter what it perceives, is always

ebhiś caturbhiḥ saṃkliṣṭaṃ mananālakṣaṇaṃ manaḥ ||
viparyāsanimittaṃ tu manaḥ kliṣṭaṃ sadaiva tat |
kuśalāvyākṛte citte sadāhaṅkāraḥ | ”

33) Engle renders the Tibetan translation of “*manyānātmakatva*” (Tib. *rlom sems*) as “reflective thought” (Engle, 2009: 345). This paper provides a broad interpretation of “self-reflective” due to the inherent nature of the *kleśa-caitasa* in *manas*, which consistently clings to the concept of ‘I.’ Accordingly, the term “self” is introduced to imply its meaning as ‘to think (思量)’ toward oneself.

34) PSkV, 108: “*tac ca nityakālam manyānātmakatvān manaḥ | pradhānyena tad eva mana ucyate |*”

accompanied with the *kleśa-caitasa* that ultimately pertain to ‘self.’ The coexistence with these *kleśa-caitasa* ultimately converges into the ‘self-reflective’ notion of ‘I.’ The ‘self’ that observes the world ultimately returns to itself, turning towards self-perception, namely, self-reflection. Therefore, since a human being revolves around self-reflection, persistently recognizes oneself, and lives as the subject, the establishment of *manas* is confirmed.

IV. Conclusion

Who am I? I am here, living in this very moment. This question and answer are based on the assumption of the existence of ‘self-reflectivity.’ This self-reflective consciousness is ‘*manas*,’ and it can be considered the subject in Buddhism. The PSk and PSkV reinforce this concept, since this work explicitly identifies the concept of ‘self’ as the central focus from a perspective of Yogācāra. Additionally, other important Yogācāra texts such as the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, *Madhyāntavibhāga*, *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, and Vś do not extensively discuss the various mental factors, including afflictions (*kleśa*) (Ueda, 1987: 65), which play a crucial role in the PSk and PSkV. Therefore, they are important treatise in this regard.

The originality of Yogācāra lies in the introduction of *manas* and *ālayavijñāna*. The introduction of *manas* in the significant works of PSk and PSkV demonstrate an exceptional concept by presenting the subject that raises metaphysical questions. This very *manas* is characterized by having four afflictions and ultimately turning towards self-reflection.

In this paper, I aimed to present this subject by establishing certain premises. I have selected the categories of the five aggregates, the twelve bases, and the eighteen elements, as well as the internal and external aspects of the subject. I have examined the factors dissociated from mind, birth, old age, sickness, and death, as well as the nature of an ordinary person. While Buddhism presents these as hypotheses to be examined regarding the structure of the worldly place, this background ultimately serves as a space for the subject.

Buddhism teaches that everything is impermanent, and afflictions need to be eliminated to reach enlightenment. However, in this paper, I establish *manas* as the subject and consider afflictions to play a positive role as a premise for liberation. Ultimately, it is confirmed that the *manas* of an individual deeply immersed in afflictions, who strives towards enlightenment, is inseparable from the establishment of subjectivity.

References

[Abbreviations]

DN : *Dīgha Nikāya*. PTS.

AKBh : *Abhidharmakośabāṣya*.

AS : *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

D : *Derge*

LAS : *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*.

PSk : *Pañcaskandhaka*.

PSkV_s : *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*.

PSkV_t : *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, Tibetan translation, D4066.

T. : *Taishō edition*

Tr : *Triṃśikākārikā*.

TrBh : *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*.

Vś : *Viṃśikā*.

Y : *Yogācārabhūmi*.

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